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THE "PRESUMPTION OF DUE CARE" IN CALIFORNIA
By SIDNEY L. WEINSTOcK and HAROLD J. CHASE
Members of the San FranciscoBar

The California Code of Civil Procedure expressly declares that there
is a disputable presumption that a person "takes ordinary care of his own
concerns."
As might be expected, this "presumption of due care" has a long and
complex history as a constantly reappearing character in California negligence cases. What this presumption actually does during its many appearances is exceeded in uncertainty only by what it is supposed to do. The
California law reveals confusion, vagueness and plain error in a series of
cases extending over the last 50 years. In case after case, the courts have
attempted to pin down the nature of this "presumption of due care"; its
function; when instructions on it are proper; and when it is "dispelled" from
a case. The efforts of our courts to answer these questions are notable chiefly
for lack of success or for error.
The source of all the difficulty is found in section 1963 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, which provides in pertinent part as follows:
"All other presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted. They are
denominated disputable presumptions, and may be controverted by other
evidence. The following are of that kind: . ..
(4) that a person takes ordinary care of his own concerns."

The California Supreme Court has, on several occasions, attempted
to lay down definitive rules governing the operation and effect of this presumption. Each attempt has only been a point of departure for new controversies over proper application of the "clarified" rules.
Some of the basic questions which have been considered by California

courts in the area of the disputable presumption of due care are:
1. Is the presumption evidence in the case, to be considered and weighed
by the trier of fact in determining whether the fact presumed to exist does
exist?'2. Will the presumption create a conflict in evidence sufficient to justify a
finding that the fact claimed and presumed2 to exist does exist, in spite
of a preponderance of evidence against it?
3. Is the presumption available to a party capable of testifying as to his own
conduct, where the issue is whether or not his conduct amounted to "due
care"?3
the application and operation
4. Is there a different set of rules governing
4
of the presumption in death cases?
'Mar Shee v. Maryland Assurance Corporation, 190 Cal. 1, 210 Pac. 269 (1922).
'Smellie v. Southern Pacific, 212 Cal. 540, 299 Pac. 529 (1931).
'Rogers v. Interstate, 212 Cal. 36, 297 Pac. 884 (1931).
'Westberg v. Willde, 14 Cal2d 360, 94 P.2d 590 (1939).
(124)
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5. Where the conduct of a party or a decedent is testified to by witnesses

for the party or the decedent upon whose behalf the presumption is invoked, is the presumption dispelled from the case; or must the evidence

of those witnesses show a lack of due care as a matter of law on the part

of the party or decedent before the presumption is dispelled? 5
In view of several recent cases, decided by the appellate courts of this
state,' it is clear that the old uncertainties regarding this presumption remain
and that our Supreme Court will again be called upon to decide important
questions in connection with those uncertainties.
This article will attempt to consider some of the problems involved in
one phase of the controversy:
Under what circumstances is the presumption of due care, invoked by a
party on his own behalf, or on behalf of a decedent, dispelled from the case
and not to be considered by the trier of fact in determining whether or not
a person whose conduct is in issue exercised ordinary care for his own
concerns.

It is the thesis of this article that reason and general rules of law show
conclusively that in any case where credible and reliable testimony shows
the actual conduct of a party, a decedent, or of a third person whose conduct
is in issue as to whether or not it amounted to ordinary care under the circumstances, there is no room in such a case for the operation of any "presumption
of due care," as evidence or otherwise, and the trier of fact is to consider the
evidence as to the conduct itself and, without the aid of any presumption,
to determine whether or not the evidence of the conduct shows that it amounted
to "ordinary care under the circumstances."
This article will be restricted insofar as possible to a consideration
of this thesis, but it is not suggested that it is felt that the other questions
listed are finally settled in our law. In fact, while the greatest uncertainty in
California law centers around the question of when the presumption of due
care is dispelled from a negligence case, other rules on the role of this
presumption as evidence may well come up for reconsideration. Certainly
there is ample reason for re-examination of many decisions which have overlooked the persuasive logic of Justice Traynor's dissent in the case of Speck
v. Sarver.'
The Nature of Presumptionsand Their Role in the Law
Preliminarily it should be pointed out that legal presumptions, in the
absence of statutes, are not generally considered as evidence. They are
useful in the law as procedural substitutes for evidence, their main purpose
'Speck v. Sarver, 20 CaI.2d 585, 128 P.2d 16 (1942).
'Tice v. Kaiser Co., 102 Cas.App.2d 44, 226 P.2d 624 (1951) ; Anderson v. San Joaquin County,
110 CaLApp.2d 703, 244 P.2d 75 (1952); Scott v. Burke, 39 Cal.2d 388, 247 P.2d 313 (1952);
Meyers v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 108 CaLApp.2d 529, 239 P.2d 118 (1952).
'Note 5, supra.
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being to throw a procedural burden of going forward on the party against
whom a presumption is invoked to show the non-existence of a fact presumed.
Presumptions are related to the doctrine of judicial notice and are based
on common human experience. Where certain facts are shown to exist, the
existence or non-existence of other facts may be reasonably presumed in
the absence of proof to the contrary. Their whole purpose is, either for
reasons of logical necessity or for the advancement of some social policy,
to force a party against whom a presumption is invoked to come forward
with evidence in rebuttal. A presumption is a rule of law to require the
production of evidence. It is not itself evidence.
The general rule is that where evidence to the contrary is offered, a
presumption disappears from the case. It then has no probative value. Its
function has been served and the contrary evidence is to be weighed and
considered and the presumption as a rule of law has no further operation.'
There is one circumstance under which a presumption as a rule of law
properly remains in the case after it is submitted to the trier of fact. This
is where the existence of the set of facts giving rise to the presumption is
contested. For example, as Wigmore points out, if an absence of seven years
gives rise to a presumption of death, the absence itself may be contested.
The trier of fact must, under proper instruction, determine whether or not
absence is proven. If it is so found, the presumption as a procedural rule of
law operates and requires a finding of death. There is no weighing of the
presumption as "evidence." It has no probative force. There simply is, under
this assumed state of evidence, no contrary evidence that the "decedent" is
alive and the procedural rule, under proper instruction, comes into play to
require a finding of death if the absence is found. The evidence being considered is the evidence on whether or not the person in question has in fact
been absent for seven years. Suppose, however, that evidence is also offered
to show that the alleged "decedent" is alive. As to this evidence, the presumption, under the general rule, has absolutely no weight as "evidence."
The trier of fact must determine the question on the evidence offered. The
absence of seven years can be given, as a proven fact, any weight to which
it is entitled. Evidence contrary to the presumption having been offered,
it is logically indefensible under any proper understanding of the nature
and function of a presumption, to allow the court to instruct that any
probative force is to be given to a presumption in this situation. The facts
giving rise to a presumption are to be considered only as facts, and not as
facts supported by a "presumption" that is "evidence." 9 If the trier of fact
'20 Am.Jur. 166. See annotation 95 A.L.R. 881 and cases there cited.
'See WIGcoRE, EVIDENCE (3d ed.), §§ 2490-2491, where this matter is discussed and particularly
see page 290, note 5, citing California cases calling presumptions "evidence" as illustrations of a
"fallacy." See, also, page 288, note 3, where California code sections on presumptions are classified
as a borrowing of "misapplied continental terms," and representing "imperfections of transitional
theory" as tending to create confusion between presumptions of "law and fact," a useless distinction

to be abandoned.
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finds the absence of seven years, it is not then to "weigh" a presumption of
death against evidence of life. The evidence to be considered is a 7-year
absence as against other testimony that the decedent is now alive.
There are many California cases construing our code sections and
holding that "presumptions are evidence" and to be weighed as such.' °
The error of these cases is amply demonstrated by the unanswerable dissent
of Justice Traynor in Speck v. Sarver referred to above. That phase of this
problem is beyond the scope of this article and it is discussed here only to
assist the examination of the problem of when the presumption of due care
is dispelled from a negligence case and is not to be considered by the trier of
fact in any way, as "evidence" or as "a procedural rule of law."
Relation of Presumptions to Burden of Proof
We are primarily concerned herein with the problem of contributory
negligence of a plaintiff or of a decedent whose representative is suing for
his wrongful death. This is so because the presumption we are considering
is the presumption that a person exercises "ordinary care for his own
concerns." However, the presumption has been successfully invoked by
defendants as "evidence" that a certain person exercised ordinary care for
the concerns of others, in fact situations where a concern for one would appear
necessarily to involve care for the other.1 1 This differentiation is seldom
analyzed in the California cases and the applicability of the presumption
is assumed.
In some jurisdictions, a plaintiff in a negligence case has the burden of
proving his freedom from negligence as an ultimate fact to warrant a judgment in his favor. 2 It is sometimes said that it is a general rule in these
jurisdictions that due care on the part of the plaintiff will not be presumed,
but that he must prove it by evidence. 3 The cases in these jurisdictions,
however, are extremely helpful in gaining a general understanding of the
problem. This is so because there the problem is recognized in terms of the
availability of evidence covering the subject of the presumption. In those
jurisdictions where it is clear that the plaintiff, under such a burden, cannot
produce evidence, lie is given the benefit of the presumption. 4 In the case
of Sandersonv. Chicago, etc., R.R., 5 the plaintiff was denied the presumption
where it was shown that evidence was availableand not produced.
In jurisdictions such as California where contributory negligence is an
affirmative defense and where presumptions are regarded as evidence, the
"See cases cited in Mar Shee v. Maryland Assurance Corporation, 190 Cal. 1, 210 Pac. 269
(1922).
"Scott v. Burke, 39 Cal.2d 388,247 P.2d 313 (1952).
"Funk v. Illinois Central R.R., 341 lIl.App. 251, 93 N.E.2d 160 (1950).
"See 65 C.J.S. 206(c).
at 341.
"See annotation, 116 A.L.R. 340
"167 Iowa 90, 149 N.W. 188 (1914).
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plaintiff is often given the benefit of the presumption as evidence where he
cannot testify or does not produce witnesses covering the subject of the
presumption." The logical fallacy of this approach will be discussed herein
but it should be kept in mind that even this rule should never apply in any
jurisdictionwhere the plaintiff or his witnesses cover by testimony the conduct
in question, whether the testimony shows contributory negligence or not.
To do so is to tend to remove the evaluation of the conduct from the trier
of fact.
It is in a jurisdiction where the plaintiff is required to prove his freedom
from contributory negligence that we see the only logical area for the operation of a so-called "presumption of due care" and in the cases in such a
jurisdiction, we can find courts intelligently applying the rules governing
the operation of a presumption as a procedural rule of law."v
In such a case, the plaintiff can properly prove a prima facie case of
the defendant's negligence and rely on the presumption of due care as
regards his own conduct, if he is unable to produce evidence covering the
conduct in question. Then, in the absence of evidence offered by the defendant, the procedural rule of law requires a finding of the plaintiff's freedom
from contributory negligence. As soon as evidence is offered by the defendant
on the issue, the rule of the presumption's operation should be satisfied and
the trier of fact should then weigh the evidence and decide whether the
conduct of the plaintiff or of the plaintiff's decedent as proven by the
defendant amounts to "ordinary care under the circumstances."
In such a jurisdiction, it is proper for a plaintiff to have a presumption
of due care, in the absence of available evidence. Inasmuch as human experience tells us, in the absence of evidence, that a man tries to prevent injury
to himself, we can use the presumption to require the defendant to come
forward wit evidence on the question. At this point, it should be noted that
where a defendant already has the burden of proving contributory negligence,
as in California, and the plaintiff is under no obligation to offer evidence on
the issue, it is logically unsound to use a presumption of due care as a
procedural rule of law to require the production of evidence by a party
against whom the presumption is invoked. He already has that duty by
"See 65 CJ.S. 206 (b) *
"'See Vance v. Grohe, 223 Iowa 1109, 274 N.W. 902, 116 A.L.R. 332 (1937), where a decedents
conduct was involved and the defendant invoked the presumption but the court discusses the case
in view of its rules developed on contributory negligence of a plaintiff. The court said:
". . . where there is direct evidence as to the facts . . . surrounding the injury, the
inference from the instinct for self preservation is secondary evidence and not to be
considered."
The court pointed out "it is settled" that an instruction on due care is proper when "direct
evidence as to the care used cannot be had. But when there is such evidence, the instinct of self
preservation cannot be given any weight by the jury . . .where the party who had the burden of
proving care can show by direct evidence what care was exercised, he should, we think, show it
by such evidence. ..."
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reason of the burden of proof. The fallacy is highlighted when we realize
that the defendant has the burden of proving contributory negligence but
the plaintiff starts out with "evidence" in his favor on this issue if the plaintiff is unable to offer evidence (yet being under no duty to do so) because
the plaintiff is then presumed to have "exercised due care" and such a presumption is "evidence" in the plaintiffs favor and to be considered by the jury.
We are considering a jurisdiction where the plaintiff has the burden of
proving freedom from contributory negligence before we consider California.
This is done because only in such a jurisdiction is there a sufficiently logical
basis to discuss the true operation of a presumption of this kind in a negligence case. While in such jurisdictions the operation and nature of a presumption such as this, as a motive force in aid of the party with the affirmative
of the issue and the burden of its proof, is generally well understood, these
courts also abandon logical analysis in certain situations on the question of
when the presumption "disappears from the case."
Let us assume such a jurisdiction and discuss what should be the role
of the presumption in the four cases logically possible:
1. The defendant has witnesses to the conduct in question and the plaintiff
has none.

2. The plaintiff has witnesses and the defendant has none.
3. Both plaintiff and defendant have witnesses.
4. Neither the plaintiff nor the defendant have witnesses.
In view of the generally understood rules on presumptions discussed
above, how should the court resolve the problem of the role of the presumption in these cases?
(a) Consider first the case where the defendant has witnesses as to
the conduct in question and the plaintiff has none. Naturally, the plaintiff
has offered no evidence on the conduct in question and the defendant's evidence is all there is. The defendant does -not offer evidence of the plaintiff's
"negligence," which is fundamentally a legal conclusion, but rather evidence
of the conduct in question concerning which a presumption is invoked by the
party with the burden of proving it is conduct amounting to "due care."
Where the defendant's evidence is uncontradicted, it is the evidence in
the case on the conduct in question. Who offered it is irrelevant. All the
witnesses might be unfavorable to the defendant and known only to the
defendant. The defendant must produce the evidence or lose on the issue
because of the operation of the presumption in favor of the plaintiff, who has
no witnesses. This is the evidence upon which the trier of fact, under
the ideal rule, should be allowed to decide whether or not the plaintiff has
sustained the burden of proving freedom from contributory negligence.
It should be noted here that there is no presumption in operation. None
is needed. It has served its purpose in requiring the defendant to produce
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evidence referring to the existence of the fact presumed, or to its nonexistence. There is now evidence to be weighed, with the risk of non-persuasion on the plaintiff. If the conduct is viewed as due care, the plaintiff
wins on this issue, as the plaintiff's burden is sustained. But it is not sustained
by any presumption, but rather by the evidence which the defendant was
forced to produce by the operation of the rule of procedure that is the
presumption.
One reason the courts overlook this analysis probably lies in their
awareness that the defendant's evidence in such a situation will be evidence
leading to an inference of negligence and will be fundamentally slanted
in favor of the defendant. There is a fear of facing the logical necessity,
under a proper operation of a presumption, of having the plaintiff who
is without available evidence rely on the defendant's evidence to sustain his
burden of proving himself free from contributory negligence. This fear
is based upon the fact that the plaintiff has the burden of proof on the issue
of contributory negligence. The courts should realize that their fundamental
complaint is with the rule of the burden of proof and that there is no
justification for twisting the rules on the proper operation of a presumption
to protect a plaintiff put into this position by having the burden of proof.
Where evidence covering the conduct in question is actually available,
it can be seen that the plaintiff has chosen to rely on the presumption. He
has not produced evidence covering the conduct as to which he has the burden
of proving that it amounted to ordinary care. Under a proper theoretical
operation of the presumption, he cannot be non-suited at the end of his case
because under the rule of the presumption, the defendant must produce
evidence on the issue or lose on that issue. This rule fulfills the standard
purpose of a presumption and it fills a need not present where the plaintiff
need not produce any evidence on the question of freedom from contributory
negligence as a part of his case. Many courts, however, deny the plaintiff
the presumption even though he has the burden of proving himself free of
negligence where he has failed to produce available evidence.
Under a rule allowing the presumption to operate properly, availability
of witnesses to either party is not a crucial question. In the case assumed,
the plaintiff need not rely on the presumption. He can call the same witnesses as the defendant calls. It is sometimes forgotten that the feudal
custom of buying witnesses is no longer the basis of any rule of law.
As has been well said, when a crime takes place in Hell, one cannot get
angels for witnesses. Testimony as to the conduct of a person in a given
set of circumstances will be provided by those people who are present
to see it. For any number of reasons, they will be favorable to one side
of the issue or the other. Nevertheless they are the witnesses.
It is clear that if the witness is unfavorable to the plaintiff, he will not
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be called by the plaintiff. But that is the plaintiff's choice. He should be
allowed to rely on the presumption of due care and not call any witness to
testify to the conduct in question. Because he has the burden of proof, he
has and needs this presumption until evidence of the conduct is offered.
Then, of course, the defendant will produce his witness to tell what he saw.
If what he saw as a witness covers the conduct in question, and leads to an
inference of negligence on the plaintiff's part, what is the plaintiff's complaint? Upon analysis, his complaint is with the fact that a witness exists
who can testify to the conduct in question. In any event, whether the plaintiff
is denied the presumption or it is dispelled by the defendant's production
of evidence, it is no longer in the case. Considerations such as these have
led courts in such jurisdictions as Iowa (see Sanderson case, supra) to
deprive the plaintiff of the presumption where the defendant produces the
evidence which was available to the plaintiff. The reasoning is often not
well worked out; actually the simple solution is to realize that the presumption has served its purpose when available evidence is produced and it therefore disappears from the case, having served its purpose.
But it is argued, suppose the witness is lying, or mistaken, or can by
cross examination be shown to be partial or prejudiced. Supposing his
testimony is not believed by the trier of fact, where does this leave the
plaintiff?
Should not the plaintiff then prevail as to the issue, in that the presumption is in his favor? The short answer is, no. The plaintiff has offered
no evidence on his freedom from negligence by proving conduct from which
due care could be inferred. The defendant has offered evidence on that
conduct, as required by the presumption. If the defendant's evidence is not
believed, its lack of credibility does not create evidence for the plaintiff. The
plaintiff's difficulty is not created by the defendant's evidence but rather by
the lack of his own and by his having the burden of proof on the issue
of contributory negligence. The plaintiff should properly be allowed to use
the presumption to force the production of evidence. By cross-examination
he can draw out from the witness, who is presumed to be speaking the truth,
all the details of what was observed as to the conduct in issue. The plaintiff
is saved from having to call this witness and vouch for his credibility on
direct examination. But the burden of proof on the issue being his, the
plaintiff must produce evidence sustaining a finding on that issue, unless
the defendant fails to produce evidence to the contrary.
It is this situation that has led courts astray so that they say, if the
defendant's evidence on the issue is not believed, there is no evidence contrary to the fact presumed, and the plaintiff prevails upon the issue of the
existence of that fact because the presumption remains in the case even after
the defendant has come forward with evidence contrary to the fact presumed.

132
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This rule can only be based on the premise that the "evidence" offered was

not available to the plaintiff.
This is the point of view that leads to bad law and confusion even in
jurisdictions that otherwise understand the proper role of presumptions."8
The evidence, brought out by the presumption, is before the jury. It is
uncontradicted by evidence of witnesses offered by the plaintiff. On crossexamination, it may have been attacked, to show its incredibility. And it
may not be believed by the trier of fact. But the real question and the only
question is whether or not the defendant has come forward with prima facie
evidence sufficient to dispel the presumption. This should be a question for
the court. For example, the defendant may offer witnesses who are incompetent, or testimony that covers conduct too long prior to the time at issue,
or the conduct may be such that the defendant's witnesses cannot be percipient
to it (a judging or misjudging of the physical consequences of an event).
In such case the court should simply rule that the demands of the
presumption have not been met as a matter of law. There is nothing there
for the trier of fact on this issue. But if the defendant has offered competent
and admissible evidence, in the case where the plaintiff has not, setting forth
the conduct in question, there is a question for the trier of fact and it is to
consider that evidence and determine if it shows conduct equal to due care on
the part of the plaintiff.1 9 The question of availability of the evidence to
the plaintiff does not clarify the situation, but only confuses the issue.
If the evidence is not believed as a representation of the conduct, that is
not the fault of the presumption which called it into being, now to be corrected
by a reappearance of the presumption in the role of positive evidence of the
plaintiff's freedom from negligence. If it is not believed, the plaintiff still
has not produced any evidence to sustain his burden of proof. The plaintiff
cannot complain that the defendant deprived him of his presumption by
coming forward with evidence on the conduct in question. The plaintiff should
be allowed to rely on the presumption to force the defendant to produce
that evidence or lose on the issue. If the court rules that competent and
admissible evidence has been produced by the defendant, the plaintiff has
had all the use of his presumption to which he is entitled. Note that where
the plaintiff does not have the burden of proof under this analysis, he has no
need of the presumption. If the defendant's evidence is not believed, the
defendant has not sustainedhis burden of proof on the issue of contributory
negligence and the plaintiff wins on this issue.
(B) Another logical possibility is that there are witnesses who can
"See 84 A.L.R. 1221, 1226 f.f., where it is pointed out that even though the rule on direct
evidence dispelling the presumption may be admitted, other cases feel that it should not be

dispelled because the direct evidence may not be credible or truly competent on the question of
due care. Therefore evidence and presumption alike go to jury.
"Sweazy v. Valley Transport, 6 Wash.2d 324, 107 P.2d 567 (1940).
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testify to the conduct in issue and are favorable to the plaintiff. Here the
plaintiff will call the witnesses. It is now too clear for argument that there
is no need for a presumption of due care on behalf of the party with the
burden of proving due care. His evidence of the conduct is not to be garnished and ballasted by a rule of law designed to force the other party to
produce evidence at the risk of losing on the issue. The presumption of due
care has no need to operate at all and it doesn't.
Now, suppose in this circumstance, the defendant has no witnesses
and no evidence on the conduct in question. And suppose the plaintiff's
witnesses are not believed in their detailed accounts of the conduct in question, all pointing unerringly to "due care." Would it be seriously contended
that the plaintiff should prevail, if the trier of fact disbelieves all the plaintiff's witnesses as liars or incompetents, simply because the defendant did
not call those very witnesses to dispel a presumption of due care that is
"still in the case," even though evidence on the very conduct in question
has been offered by the party relying on this presumption? The only thing
necessary to be done in this case is for the trier of fact to decide whether
or not the plaintiff has sustained, by the evidence offered, the burden of
proof of freedom from contributory negligence. If the plaintiff's evidence
is believed, and if the conduct then proven is viewed as "due care" the
plaintiff prevails on this question.
Here the defendant is caught without favorable witnesses, just as the
plaintiff was in the discussion above. Being caught without "favorable
witnesses" is often the consequence of being legally responsible or legally
without remedy. It is not a circumstance upon which fallacious rules of law
are to be based.
It is hard to understand the resistance to the simple logic of dispensing
with presumptions wherever evidence is offered sufficient to present a question
of fact for the trier of fact.
(C) Still another possibility is the case where the plaintiff has witnesses
who will testify to the conduct in issue and the defendant also has witnesses
who will testify as to the conduct in issue with the two versions offered leading
to opposite inferences on the question of the conduct amounting to "due
care." This is easily recognized as the typical negligence case. There is no
confusion in the rules here, particularly where no decedent's conduct is
involved. The ordinary rules and instructions on burden of proof and the
effect of the belief and disbelief of testimony are easily understood and
universally accepted and no one contends that either side is aided or burdened
by any presumption concerning the conduct in question.
(D) There is also the possibility that there are no witnesses of any kind
to the conduct in question. We are assuming the plaintiff has the burden
of proving that the conduct in question amounted to "due care." The plaintiff
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can logically and legitimately rely on a presumption that the person in question exercised ordinary care for his own concerns. The operation of the
presumption requires that the defendant come forward with evidence as to
the conduct in question or lose on the issue as a matter of law. It is eminently
clear that this is the classic situation for the operation of the presumption
based on the common human understanding of the instinct for self preservation. Of course, the defendant loses on the issue of contributory negligence.
But his losing is consonant with justice and logic. The plaintiff may prove
his case on the defendant's negligence and he may well have no witnesses
to show the conduct in issue on the question of contributory negligence to
the trier of fact. There is no need to "weigh the presumption as evidence."
The defendant has not come forward to show what the conduct was and the
fact of due care is presumed to exist.
The Presumption of Due Care in California
As we leave the jurisdictions where the plaintiff has the burden of proof
of the issue of freedom from contributory negligence, and enter California
where the defendant has the burden of proof of this issue, we enter an area
of misunderstanding, confusion and error. The discussion above was
designed to highlight the errors present in some of the California cases.
In the first place, in California the "presumption of due care" is treated
in some cases as having none of the characteristics of a presumption, as
discussed above; it is simply treated as "evidence." Its relationship to the
burden of proof and its role as a procedural rule of law requiring the production of evidence are neither analyzed nor discussed. Serious prejudice
to the party against whom it is invoked is often dismissed or overlooked.
This position is based upon an erroneous construction of several California statutes, 0 which it is fallaciously contended, make presumptions
"evidence" in our law.
Under this position, if followed to its ultimate fantasy, every plaintiff
in every negligence case is entitled to an instruction that he is presumed
under the law to have exercised ordinary care for his own concerns and that
the presumption is evidence in the case and can be weighed as against
contrary evidence. Thus a party could tell what he saw and did up to the
time of the accident and submit his conduct to the trier of fact, buttressed
by a "presumption" which the law requires, that this conduct amounted to
"due care." (Defendants could also claim the evidence of the presumption,
assuming its applicability to defendants.) The other party may offer evidence
showing that that party did not exercise care for his own concerns. But the
trier of fact is told to "weigh" a presumption of due care against this evi2

Cal. Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1957, 1963, 1961 and 2061(2). See dissent, Speck v. Sarver, supra,
note 5.

"PRESUMPTION OF DUE CARE" IN CALIFORNIA

135

dence. The role of the trier of fact is extremely difficult in such a situation.
It can view the conduct and weigh it as evidence. It may feel that the conduct
of the party invoking the presumption amounted to contributory negligence.
Or it may not believe the testimony from which it might draw an inference
of care. But it is told that there is "a presumption of due care" and to weigh
it in favor of the party invoking it. Only a trained mystic can "weigh" a
presumption. Further, the party against whom such a presumption is invoked
must convince the trier of the fact under the law, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the conduct amounted to contributory negligence in order
to win on that issue. He would have shown one version of the conduct and
the other party another, but the version of the party invoking the presumption would have a deeper resource in a presumption of due care in spite of
the fact that he had submitted his conduct and asked that it be viewed as
ordinary care for his own concerns.
If a presumption is in fact evidence, as our cases say, this should be
the law. However, it is not. Thus, rules have been developed to provide in
certain cases that the presumption of due care, even though "evidence" in
the case, is dispelled from the case and is not to be considered by the trier
of fact in any way.
The so-called leading case on this point is Mar Shee v. Maryland Assurance Company.' This case, while good law in itself, is the fountainhead
of error in California law for the role of the presumption of due care in
negligence cases and, for that reason, it deserves close analysis.
This case is cited and relied on for the rule that the rebuttable presumptions set forth in California Code of Civil Procedure, section 1963, are evidence in a case and are not dispelled from a case until facts are proven
against a party invoking a presumption which shows as a matter of law the
non-existence of the fact presumed. It is said in that case that a fact is
proven against a party only when his own evidence, submitted without inadvertence or mistake, shows, as a matter of law, the non-existence of the fact
presumed. Thus, overwhelming evidence showing the non-existence of the
fact presumed offered by the party against whom the presumption is invoked
will not dispel the presumption under this rule, and the presumption creates
a conflict in evidence so that the issue must go to the trier of fact. Neither
will evidence offered by the party invoking the presumption dispel it, even
though an inference of the non-existence of the fact presumed might justifiably be drawn from that party's evidence. His evidence must show the
non-existence as a matter of law. Another way of stating it is, if the party
invoking the presumption offers evidence that puts him out of court, the
presumption is "dispelled" from the case, assuming an ultimate fact is
"1190 CaL. 1, 210 Pac. 269 (1922).
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involved whose existence is determinative of the issue of liability, and such
a fact is always involved in these cases.
There are several basic aspects of the Mar Shee case that have been
completely overlooked by courts relying upon it to support instructions on
the presumption of due care in negligence cases.
1. The Mar Shee case was not a negligence case and the plaintiff in
that case had the burden of proof on the issue with respect to which the
presumption there in question was invoked.
In this case the plaintiff was seeking to recover under an insurance
policy which insured the decedent Fong Wing against ". . . death . . .
effected independently and exclusively of all other causes directly through
accidental means." Under such a policy the burden of proof is on the
plaintiff to bring himself within its terms and prove the death was from a
cause insured against. 2 This policy had an exclusion to the effect that the
insurer was not liable for death from murder. To prove the death resulted
from a cause excluded would be the burden of the defendant insurer except
that the plaintiff's burden on this issue if sustained makes the sustaining of
the defendant's burden impossible.
Fong Wing was found lying on the street with two bullets in his back
by a "witness" who heard the shots, and after some delay due to fear, went
out to investigate. The person who fired the shots had disappeared and no
weapon was found.
The presumption relied upon by plaintiff to sustain the burden of proof
of accidental death was that found in California Code of Civil Procedure,
section 1963(1) stating that a person is presumed "innocent of crime or
wrong." This case went to the jury and a verdict for the plaintiff was
returned. The defendant appealed and the Supreme Court held that the facts
above as proved by the plaintiff to show death also proved murder in the
first degree and precluded any possible inference of accidental death. Therefore, there was no sphere within which the presumption could operate. It
was held that, as a matter of law, there was no evidence upon which a finding
of accidental death could be predicated. The presumption was "dispelled."
This decision is proper but it is clear that the court was unaware of why
it was proper. Whether or not there is a sphere within which a presumption
can properly operate is, in the first instance, a question for the court. This
is not a question of "evidence." For example, as has been discussed above,
on a presumption of death from seven years absence the party with the
burden of proof invoking such a presumption must prove the existence of
facts from which the presumption arises. If, in such a case, the plaintiff
offers no evidence of absence or evidence showing a lack of the required
"New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Breschini, 64 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1933).
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absence, the plaintiff is properly non-suited at the close of his case. There
is no room for the operation of the presumption to require the defendant to
proceed and offer evidence that the "decedent" is alive.
In this case, the plaintiff proved a death in such a manner that the only
possible inference was a deliberate shooting of Fong Wing (it may have been
a "mistake" in the sense that Fong Wing was killed23 but there is no room
for a presumption that the assailant was "innocent of crime or wrong").
Thus the holding was proper on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to
bring himself within the terms of his policy. A non-suit would have been
proper.
The defendant in this case, of course, met the presumption and tried to
rebut it with evidence of Fong Wing's being involved in a particular situation
in which his life was threatened and in which motive for his murder existed.
The court held that this evidence was so vague as to give rise to pure conjecture and speculation. Thus it is clear that the court felt that the plaintiff
had failed in his burden as far as this defendant was concerned, and that if
the plaintiff had had a sphere of operation for the presumption, it is quite
clear that he would have prevailed as a matter of law because the defendant
was unable to offer evidence of the conduct of the assailant required by the
proper operation of the presumption to prevent his losing on the issue of
"accidental death" as opposed to "murder." In many ways it is extremely
unfortunate that Fong Wing was not found with a broken neck, all other
circumstances remaining the same. In such case, it is entirely possible that
the court would have recognized the proper role of presumptions and ended
the "confusion and decisions in this State," which the court stated then
existed, as to when presumptions are to be considered as "evidence" in a case.
However, the court laid down its famous rule that a party invoking
and establishing a right to a presumption is entitled to have the presumption
remain in the case and be weighed as evidence except when he and his
witnesses offer testimony, which as a matter of law, shows the non-existence
of the fact presumed. It can be seen from a study of the case that almost all
of the rule is dictum, inasmuch as the court's holding is that the plaintiff
actually failed to establish his right to the presumption in the first instance.
The court failed to see that they were not dealing with a case involving a
"dispelling" of a presumption when a party has established a prima facie
right to invoke it. The presumption in this case was not "dispelled"; it
simply never entered the case.
In a California negligence case, where the plaintiff offers proof of
"Which brings up the justly famous pun, not submitted as authority for any particular point:
"We wanted Lee Yung

But we winged Willie Wong.
A sad but excusable
Slip of the Tong."
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the defendant's negligence and offers no evidence on his own conduct, he
automatically (and illogically) has created a sphere of operation for the
presumption of his freedom from contributory negligence. The Mar Shee
case is of no help in deciding what the proper rule should be governing the
dispelling of that presumption from the case.
2. The second point about the case is that there were no witnesses to
the conduct in question. No one saw the assailant. Yet it was the assailant's
conduct about which the presumption was invoked. Assuming for the moment
that this was not a case of clear-cut murder, it is interesting to speculate
on how the court would have faced up to the question about which later cases
are still confused. Supposing Fong Wing were found with a broken neck and
an eyewitness was produced by the defendant who saw a man wrestling with
Fong Wing, known to the witness as one who had threatened to kill Fong
Wing and who had motive for so doing. Suppose he then saw Fong Wing
fall and the third party run from the scene. Suppose this eyewitness was
available to and known to the plaintiff and defendant. The plaintiff would
not call him. The plaintiff need only prove that Fong Wing was found with
a broken neck. The plaintiff properly should have the benefit of the presumption of accidental death and needs it to get by a non-suit, having the burden of
proof on showing that the policy covers. Then the defendant cones forward
with the evidence set forth above. Certainly the court could then have seen the
problems involved and the role of a presumption more clearly and it would
have been able to end all uncertainty by holding that the presumption was
dispelled and the jury was to consider the defendant's evidence and decide
whether or not on that evidence the plaintiff had sustained the burden of
proving accidental death by a preponderance of the evidence.
In any event the Mar Shee case is cited and relied on in a line of cases
involving plaintiffs in negligence cases, who do not have the burden of proof
on contributory negligence, as authority for their contention that if they do
not prove by their testimony and that of their witnesses that as a matter of
law the conduct concerning which the presumption of due care is invoked
amounted to contributory negligence, they are entitled to an instruction that
there is a presumption that the conduct amounted to due care, to be weighed
as evidence in the case.
The landmark case often cited as adopting the rule of the Mar Shee
case in a negligence case involving a presumption of freedom from contributory negligence is Smellie v. Southern Pacific.2 4 This was a death case and
that fact is one of the sources of error in this field. For some reason it is
felt in some cases that where the conduct of a decedent is in question, this
presumption has greater vitality and a broader field of operation. It should
be clear that the rules governing rebuttable presumptions should be no differ-Supra, note 2.
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ent simply because a decedent's conduct is in question. The principal problem
in this case was whether or not the testimony of a witness called under California Code of Civil Procedure, section 2055, was such testimony offered
by a plaintiff as to deprive him of the presumption of freedom from contributory negligence where such testimony showed the conduct of the plaintiff's decedent up to the time of the accident. It was held that the testimony
offered by a witness called under California Code of Civil Procedure, section
2055, was not the testimony of a party or of his witness within the rule of
Afar Shee and, in any event, that rule required the plaintiff's evidence to show
the decedent's contributory negligence as a matter of law, it not being sufficient
simply to describe his conduct up to the time of the accident, in order to dispel
the presumption of due care from the case.
The testimony of the witness called under section 2055 of the Code of
Civil Procedure was considered and it was held that because it was that of
an adverse party and because of other weaknesses it did not show the
decedent's conduct to be negligent as a matter of law. Therefore, it was held
that there was a conflict of evidence between the "evidence" of the presumption and the evidence against it to be weighed by the jury. The trial court's
directed verdict in favor of the defendant was then reversed. Actually the
case is really not in point on the question of when a plaintiff's evidence will
dispel a presumption of a person's freedom from contributory negligence
from a case, conceding that it does expressly decide that such a presumption
is evidence in a case to be weighed by the jury as against evidence offered
by a party against whom the presumption is invoked. Its basic and, it is felt,
erroneous holding is that when the presumption is properly in the case it is
"evidence" to be weighed against the defendant's evidence tending to show
contributory negligence, thus creating a conflict of evidence. It is not a case
where a plaintiff has himself offered evidence on the conduct in question up
to the time of the accident, inasmuch as the evidence being considered was
held not to be the plaintiff's evidence. The simple solution to the case was
for the court to rely on the obvious fact that the testimony of the defendant's
witness called under section 2055 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not
show the decedent guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. The
presumption of due care had no connection with the weakness of that evidence.
A directed verdict in favor of the defendant was improper without reference
to the presumption.
Then came the leading case of Speck v. Sarver, 5 which cited and relied
on Rogers v. Interstate Transit Company,2 6 this latter case having been
decided after Mar Shee and before Smellie. These cases greatly limited the
applicability of the incorrect dictum of Mar Shee and held that where a
5.
"Supra,Cal.note
36, 297 Pac. 884 (1931).
"212
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plaintiff or his witnesses testify to his conduct up to the time of the accident,
there is no room in such a case for an instruction that a plaintiff is presumed
to be free from contributory negligence, whether or not the plaintiff's evidence shows contributory negligence as a matter of law.
The case of Speck v. Sarver arose out of an automobile accident. Both
parties survived, an occurrence of increasing rarity. Both parties testified.
The facts showed a head-on collision and each driver claimed the other was
on the wrong side of the road. The jury found that the defendant was negligent and the defendant appealed, claiming error in the giving of the standard
instruction of the presumption of due care in favor of the plaintiff.
As the Supreme Court said at page 18 of the Pacific Reporter:
"Such an instruction, however, should not be given where the evidence
introduced by the plaintiff discloses the acts and conduct of the injured party
immediately prior to or at the time in question."
And the court continued, quoting from the Rogers case:
"In either event [i.e., whether the jury felt that the conduct as proven
by the plaintiff amounted to negligence or not] the jury, in determining
whether the plaintiff was guilty of negligence, would look to, and be governed
by, the evidence before the court, and not by any presumption."
In the Speck case, the giving of the instruction was held to be error but
not prejudicial error, in that there was ample evidence on both sides of the
question of contributory negligence and the jury was properly instructed
on the question of contributory negligence. Justice Traynor dissented and
wrote his opinion, already referred to, which clearly lays forth the fundamental error in considering and weighing the presumption as evidence, which
27
rule depends for its existence upon the case of Smellie v. Southern Pacific,
a case which Justice Traynor points out is in error in its contention that
presumptions are evidence to be weighed as such. At page 23 of the Pacific
Reporter of the Speck case Justice Traynor states a crucial truism:
"Confusion is rife, however, because presumptions have not been clearly
divested of their artificial character."
That confusion will remain until such time as the real problem is clearly
understood by the courts.
To state briefly the position of Justices Traynor and Edmonds as set
forth in this dissent, it is their opinion that presumptions are not evidence,
impossible to be weighed as such, and that it is prejudicial error to instruct
a jury to weight them as evidence because such a rule enables a jury
"arbitrarily" to attribute more weight to a presumption than to evidence
against it, no matter how extensive or persuasive. The rule is felt to be
"so arbitrary, and its consequences so mischievous that it becomes imperative
to set forth to what lengths it has departed from the function and purposes
"Supra, note 2.
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of presumptions." They then admit that a presumption has greater vitality
in California than in the majority of other jurisdictions in view of our statute,
section 2061 of California Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that a
judge shall instruct a jury on all proper occasions that they are not bound
to decide in conformity with evidence which does not produce conviction in
their minds as against a presumption.
Thus, in California, unlike most other jurisdictions (see general discussion above), it must be conceded that the mere production of evidence
contrary to a presumption does not dispel it from a case. In a jurisdiction
where the plaintiff has the burden of proof on the issue and is without
evidence covering the conduct in question there is some small basis for the
"intermediate" point of view that he should not be deprived of the presumption's operation as a procedural rule when the defendant's evidence is not
believed. To deprive such a plaintiff of the presumption would mean his
defeat by incredible testimony. Where the defendant's evidence is competent
such a deprivation would be logically correct, but a rule allowing such a
defeat is often felt to be too harsh. An instruction to that effect can at least
be justified in such a jurisdiction. It cannot be justified in California and,
it is submitted that the statute in question giving "greater vitality" to presumptions in California than they are normally entitled to should be construed
as having applicability only in a case such as Mar Slee, where the party
invoking the presumption has the burden of proving the fact presumed.
However, where the party invoking the presumption offers the evidence
of his or his decedent's conduct, there should be absolutely no problem and
it is clear beyond rational dispute that the analysis of Speck v. Sarver controls
as set forth in the majority opinion.
Speck v. Sarver represents an intermediate position with respect to the
role of a presumption. It deals solely with the question when it is dispelled
from a case. The majority opinion does not consider the basic problem of
whether or not a presumption is evidence. It is clearly said to be the rule
that where a plaintiff or his witnesses offer proof of the conduct in question,
the trier of fact is to consider that conduct without the aid of any presumption
on the issue of contributory negligence. That conduct need not show contributory negligence as a matter of law to dispel the presumption. Thus, the
Mar Shee rule is greatly limited and that case and the Smnellie case are not
mentioned in the majority opinion. In the Sarver case, there was no decedent
involved and the plaintiff testified as to his own conduct.
The problem presented where the only evidence offered on the conduct
in question is the defendant's evidence is not present and not discussed. In
the dissent, it is clearly stated that in such a case the presumption should have
a limited sphere of operation because of California Code of Civil Procedure,
section 2061. Thus, if the defendant's evidence of the conduct is not believed,
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we are then in the position of no evidence on the issue having been offered;
the presumption comes into play and the finding of freedom from contributory negligence could be based upon it. How foolish this is as a reverse
operation of the rules governing presumptions can be seen when we recall
that the defendant has the burden of proof on the issue of contributory
negligence and if his evidence on this issue is not believed he has not sustained
his burden and there is no need for any presumption that the plaintiff was
free of contributory negligence. The finding should properly be based on
the lack of the defendant's evidence on the issue.
However, even in that case, the proper instruction to the jury is not
that it is presumed that the plaintiff, who did not offer evidence, or his
decedent, was free of contributory negligence and that this presumption is
evidence to be weighed against evidence to the contrary. Rather, the jury
should be told that the presumption is not evidence in itself nor to be weighed
as such, but that if the defendant's evidence is not believed as a representation of that conduct and if they find that no credible evidence has been offered
to show what the conduct in question was, there is then a presumption that
the conduct amounted to ordinary care; and that if they believe that the
conduct was as represented by the defendant, they are then to weigh that
conduct and consider whether or not it shows, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the conduct in question amounted to contributory negligence
and that in such a case they are not to consider any presumption of due care.
Such instructions would not prejudice the defendant even though they are
illogical because under this assumed state of facts the defendant would lose
on the issue of contributory negligence in any case, if his evidence is not
believed.
Developments Since Speck v. Sarver
The rule of Speck v. Sarver is clear. It is the law of California as
declared by its highest court and states that there is no room for the presumption of due care in the case where the plaintiff or his witnesses offer evidence
of the conduct in question. It does state that on the facts of that case the
giving of an instruction that the presumption was to be considered by the
jury was not prejudicial to the defendant. On the special facts of the case,
this may well have been true. The plaintiff and the defendant in that case
each claimed the other was on the wrong side of the road. A finding that
the defendant was negligent almost necessarily implied that the plaintiff
was on his own side of the road. In a multitude of cases, however, the plaintiff's contributory negligence and the defendant's negligence are not mutually
exclusive in any sense of the word and where the question of a plaintiff's
or a decedent's contributory negligence is close the presumption will fre-
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quently, if not always, turn the scales if its "weight" is added to the plaintiff's
own evidence on the conduct in question."
Since Speck v. Sarver, the problem of "dispelling the presumption"
by the plaintiff's evidence has had enough consideration to indicate that we
are still plagued by faulty analysis of this problem.
It might have been assumed that the case of Barker v. The City of Los
Angeles29 would have helped to end the confusion on this question. In that
case the plaintiff was a passenger in a car driven by her husband, deceased
at the time of trial. His death was not caused by the accident. The plaintiff
testified to her husband's conduct up to and immediately preceding the time
of the accident. The trial court instructed the jury that the decedent was
presumed to have exercised ordinary care for his own safety, with the usual
admonition concerning weighing this presumption as evidence. There was
no evidence offered by the plaintiff to show her husband was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. On appeal, the giving of the instruction was held to be error. It was also held to be non-prejudicial error and
the facts of the particular case amply justified this holding. There was absolutely no evidence of the decedent's contributory negligence and the evidence
of the defendant city's negligence was, to say the least, substantial. The prejudice would appear to be obvious in those cases involving close questions
of the plaintiff's or his decedent's contributory negligence.
It is interesting to note that in this case the appellate court deduced its
rule from Speck v. Sarver and commented on the "apparently conflicting
decisions" on the question in California.
The fact that this case involved a decedent's conduct naturally brings up
the old case of Testberg v. Willde,3 ° which attempted to lay down a preculiar
rule that raises its head frequently to confuse attorneys and courts alike.
This case antedates Speck v. Sarver by a considerable period of time. It
was, in a sense, a predecessor for the rule of Speck v. Sarver, as can be seen
from the part of the opinion set forth below. The court indicated in the
Westberg case that in prior decisions it had left open the question of when a
plaintiff's testimony or that of his witnesses would dispel the presumption
of due care from a negligence case.
The court was here considering an action for wrongful death arising
out of an intersection accident to which there were three independent witnesses, all called by the plaintiff. The testimony of these witnesses was to
the effect that the car driven by the plaintiff's decedent entered the intersection
first at a speed of anywhere from 20 to 30 miles per hour. The plaintiff's
eyewitnesses also estimated the speed of the defendant's truck at anywhere
2'Clary v. Lindley, 30 Cal.App.2d 571, 86 P.2d 920 (1939).
-'57 Cal.App.2d 742, 135 P.2d 573 (1943).

"14 Cal.2d 360, 94 P.2d 590 (1939).
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from 25 to 50 miles per hour. The defendant's appeal from a verdict in
favor of the plaintiff was based on error in instructions, it being conceded
that the evidence would sustain a finding of the decedent's freedom from
contributory negligence and the defendant's negligence. The defendant contended that it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury that there was
a presumption that every man obeys the law and that it was to be presumed
in that case that the decedent was driving on the right side of the street at
a lawful rate of speed.
The defendant had no witnesses other than himself. There was no con-

tention that the plaintiff's witnesses showed the decedent's contributory negligence as a matter of law. Therefore, the court was faced with a situation
calling for an application of the rule of the Mar Shee and Smellie cases.
Obviously the decedent's conduct was shown by his own witnesses. The

defendant offered a different version of the accident. The jury might believe
one version or the other. Was it proper to give an instruction to strengthen

the plaintiff's evidence to the effect that he was obeying the law? It should
be noted that "the presumption of due care" was not involved in the case

and it can be distinguished on this basis, in that the defendant could have
requested a similar instruction on his presumed obedience to the law whereas
a presumption that he exercised "ordinary care for his own concerns" would
not have been relevant inasmuch as his contributory negligence was not in

issue. Further, he testified fully as to his own conduct. The court overlooked
this and considered the case as if the usual due care presumption were
involved. As can be seen from the following language, the court felt the
innate logic and justice of the rule later developed in Speck v. Sarver greatly
limiting Mar Shee and Smellie but the court apparently became confused over

the fact that a decedent's conduct was involved.
"We think it well to state here that in our opinion there is a substantial
difference in the situation before a court where the question of the plaintiff's
negligence is in issue and both plaintiff and his witnesses testify to all his
acts and conducts at the time of his alleged negligence, from a situation where
the acts and conduct of a decedent are the issues before the court. In the
first instance, all possible facts both in favor of and against the alleged negligence of the plaintiff are before the court, and it is difficult for us to perceive
how any presumption as to his conduct can add to or detract from this
evidence.... but if such evidence did not clearly and unmistakably clear
him of the charge of negligence, then an instruction which would place his
testimony in a more favorable light than it would be without such instruction
would seem to be uncalled for, if not improper. In such a case the giving of
any instruction as to the presumption of plaintiff's conduct would seem to
be of doubtful propriety. .

.

. But in the other situation, where the acts and

conduct of the deceased person are a subject of inquiry, and the testimony
respecting such acts and conducts necessarily must be produced by witnesses
other than the deceased, unless such testimony meets the requirement of the
rule in the Mar Shee case, and other cases decided by this court following the
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Mar Shee case, an instruction that the deceased is presumed to have exercised
ordinary care of his own concerns is not only proper but this court in an
3
unbroken line of decisions, has sustained the giving of such an instruction." '

It can be seen that the court is stating that in a case where a decedent's
conduct is being considered, the rule of the Mar Shee and Smellie cases
applies and the presumption is dispelled only if the plaintiff's witnesses prove
the decedent was negligent as a matter of law. The distinction is without
logical justification and the court cites. no authority to support it. The mere
fact that the instruction has been given in cases involving decedents does not
justify a rule that it must always be given in such cases. The long established case of Mundy v. Marshall,3 2 cited by the court, clearly shows the
instruction was properly refused in a case where a decedent's conduct was
proven by the plaintiff's own witnesses.
A reading of this case shows that the reason for the Supreme Court's
holding the presumption dispelled was not that the plaintiff's witnesses offered
evidence showing that the decedent was contributorily negligent as a matter
of law, although this was true. The court's reasoning was based on its prior
language in the case of Paulsen v. McDuffie,3 3 which it cites after its statement that:
"The manner in which the decedent was crossing the street having been
covered by the plaintiff's own evidence there is no room jor the presumption
that he was exercising due care .. .and it cannot be relied upon to establish
a conflict in the evidence." (Emphasis added.)
The court did not cite the Smellie and Mar Shee cases. The reasoning
was that the trial court could consider evidence of the decedent's conduct
without considering the presumption. The case appears to make it clear that
if the trial court had felt the conduct to be equivocal on the question of the
decedent's negligence, the case would have been submitted to the jury by the
trial court without the instruction on weighing the presumption of due care
as evidence, and the Supreme Court would have approved this procedure.
In the Paulsen case the Supreme Court did mention the fact that consideration of the presumption was proper where a decedent's conduct was involved
and improper and prejudicial where the plaintiff would be barred by contributory negligence and he and his witnesses testified as to his conduct (the
Paulsencase arose under the Jones Act34 and contributory negligence was not
a bar to the plaintiff's action). However, the court was, in the Paulsen case,
not maling the point that when a decedent's conduct is being considered, the
presumption always applies. The court did refer to the Smellie case, pointing
out that in that case the party whose conduct was in question was dead and
"Id. at 367, 94 P.2d 590, 594.
"8 Cal.2d 294, 65 P.2d 65 (1937).
"4 Cal.2d 111, 47 P.2d 709 (1935).
z"46 U.S.C.A. § 688.
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could not testify. But in the Smellie case there were no witnesses offered
by the plaintiff covering the decedent's conduct. In the Paulsen case, the
court pointed out not only the fact that the plaintiff testified but also the fact
that "other witnesses observed the plaintiff and gave in detail a complete
account of the whole affair which resulted in the plaintiff's injuries." The
court continued:
"It is difficult to see how there was any place for a presumption as to
the plaintiff's conduct. What he did on that occasion was entirely covered
by the evidence in the case, and there was neither necessity nor reason for
indulging in any presumption upon that subject. That instruction had no
place in this case and should not have been given. Had this been a case
where the contributory negligence of the plaintiff would have defeated his
claim for damages, the consequences following the giving of that instruction
might have been most serious, and possibly might have required a reversal of
the judgment."35 (Emphasis added.)

The court does not even bother to consider whether the "other witnesses"
were the plaintiff's or the defendant's witnesses. It was sufficient for the court
that the plaintiff's conduct was in evidence.
It is submitted that the Jestberg case36 went astray in attempting to
make a special rule on the dispelling of presumptions for death cases. Their
desire to limit the Smellie and Mar Shee cases was understandable but they
might have considered that the Mar Shee case itself did not involve the
conduct of the decedent but rather the conduct of a stranger to which there
were no eyewitnesses for either side. And in the Smellie case the plaintiff
offered no witnesses on the question.
Since Speck v. Sarver some courts have attempted to get our law back
on the track on this phase of the problem.
The Barker case3" is one example; another is Tice v. Kaiser Company.3 s
This latter case involved the conduct of a decedent who was killed by one of
the defendant's workmen while working on a construction job. The plaintiff's
own witnesses established the conduct up to the time of the accident, showing
his knowledge of the particular danger which resulted in his death and
showing his conduct in taking the particular physical position which he took
in his work. There was no evidence of conduct that would amount to contributory negligence as a matter of law. In fact, the case went to the jury
on all questions and the instructions on the presumption were given. This,
on appeal, was held to be error and prejudicial to the defendant. Many
of the cases involving this problem were reviewed and the court followed
the rule laid down in Speck v. Sarver, logically not attempting to modify that
rule because a decedent's conduct was involved. This is the type of case
8

4 Cal.2d 111, 119, 47 P.2d 709, 714 (1935).

Supra, note 30.

"Supra, note 29.
"8102 Cal.App.2d 44,266 P.2d 624 (1951).
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where the evidence on the decedent's contributory negligence presents a close
question. The trier of fact must decide whether or not the conduct shown
was negligent. The court in this case recognized the serious prejudice which
results when the trier of fact is directed that in such a situation the conduct
shown is presumed to amount to due care.
The case of Cole v. Ridings39 is interesting because the instruction given
was to the effect that both parties were entitled to presumptions that each took
ordinary care of his own concerns and that each obeyed the law. The jury
was told to weigh the presumptions as evidence against evidence in conflict
with them. The case is particularly interesting because the plaintiff claimed
that the giving of such an instruction was prejudicial error.
The case involved a pedestrian plaintiff who was struck by a motorcycle. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant. The appeal was based
upon the giving of erroneous instructions. The questions of negligence and
contributory negligence were close and the evidence was ample to sustain a
verdict either way. The plaintiff, a child, testified, as did her witnesses, to
her conduct up to the time of the accident. The defendant testified fully as to
his conduct. The instruction on the presumption that each party took ordinary care of his own concerns favored both the plaintiff and the defendant.
There was not the slightest question of contributory negligence as a matter
of law.
The court followed the rules of logic in holding that the giving of the
instructions was prejudicial error. It simply does not matter which side is
invoking the presumption. The proper rule shows, in fact, that presumptions
are not evidence at all. If they are evidence, they should never be dispelled
from a case. In considering the problem, the court used the following language; picking up a line of cases that preceded Speck v. Sarver, and citing
the Barker case, which followed Speck v. Sarver:
"In Clary v. Lindley, 30 Cal.App.2d 571, 573 [86 P.2d 920], the following appears:
" 'A disputable presumption is a substitute for proof of facts. It is a
species of evidence that may be accepted and acted upon when there is no
other evidence to uphold the contention for which it stands.' (Noble v. Key
System, 10 Cal.App.2d 132, 137 [51 P.2d 887].) It may be controverted
by evidence. (Code of Civ. Proc., Sec. 1961.) It is dispelled when evidence
is produced by the party or his witnesses covering the subject of the presumption. (Rogers v. Interstate Transit Co., 212 Cal. 36 [297 P.2d 884].) When
there is a conflict in the evidence introduced by opposing parties, there is no
room for the presumption (Kelly v. Fretz, 19 Cal.App.2d 356 [65 P.2d 914],
for the simple reason that one side or the other would be forced to introduce
evidence to controvert other evidence, plus a presumption. (Paulsen v.
McDuffie, 4 Cal.2d 111 [47 P.2d 709]; Mundy v. Marshall, 8 Cal.2d 294
[65 P.2d 65].)"
"95 Cal.App.2d 136, 212 P.2d 597 (1949).
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"In Barker v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal.App.2d 742, 749 [135 P.2d
5731, the court discussed an instruction similar to that here under review,
to wit: 'From apparently conflicting opinions of the appellate courts of California, the following rules may be adduced:
"'(1) It is error for the trial court to give an instruction such as that
set forth above where the evidence introduced by the plaintiff disclosed the
acts and conduct of the injured party immediately prior to or at the time of
the accident. (Citations.)
"'(2) Whether the giving of such an instruction when the evidence of
the plaintiff disclosed the acts and conduct of the injured party at the time of
the accident constitutes prejudicial error depends on the circumstances of
each case. (Citation.)'
"Applying the above rules to the instant cause, it was prejudicial error
for the trial court to give the instruction on the presumption of due
care ... "

A later case, Dunn v. Russell,4" presents an example of the total confusion created by a misunderstanding of the nature of a presumption.
A hearing was granted in the Supreme Court in this case on September 27,
1951. Apparently the case was disposed of before decision on the hearing
but a reading of the opinion indicates that if a decision had been rendered,
the Appellate Court should have been reversed.
In this case the plaintiff had collided with the rear end of a truck which
it was alleged was negligently parked along the highway. The plaintiff died
prior to the trial, the death not being connected with the accident. On the
trial, the defendant truck driver testified completely as to his conduct and
the details of his conduct were submitted to the jury for their consideration
on the issue of the defendant's negligence. The decedent's administratrix
had been substituted as party plaintiff. It so happened that the administratrix
had been a passenger in the plaintiff's automobile at the time of the accident
and she testified in complete detail as to the conduct of the decedent up to
and at the time of the accident. The verdict of the jury was in favor of the
defendant. The plaintiff appealed.
The appeal was based principally on the contention that an instruction
on the presumption of due care on the part of the decedent had not been given
to the jury by the court. The instruction in question was identical with the
instruction used in the case of Cole v. Ridings discussed above.
The instruction stated in general form that each party to the action was
entitled to the presumption of law that every person takes ordinary care of
his own concerns and that he obeys the law. It was the plaintiff's contention
that the instruction did not identify the decedent by name and that she did
not get the benefit of the presumption because she was not technically a "party
to the action" after her death. The court indicated that the jury could not
have misunderstood that the instruction applied to the conduct of the decedent.
40234 P.2d 270 (1951).
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However, the court did find the giving of the instruction erroneous and
prejudicial to the plaintiff in that it also gave the respondent defendant the
benefit of the presumption of due care. The court stated that inasmuch as
the defendant had testified to his conduct immediately prior to the time of
the accident he was not entitled to the presumption that he exercised ordinary
care for his own concerns. The court relied on the case of Speck v. Sarver.
Of course it can be seen that the court completely overlooked the fact that
there was no issue of the defendant's contributory negligence and completely
ignored the fact that the administratrix, as the nominal plaintiff, had testified
completely and in detail to the conduct of the decedent up to and at the time
of the accident. The court felt that there was a sharp conflict on the evidence
of Russell's conduct and that the presumption may have tipped the scales
in his favor on the question of his freedom from negligence.
Of course it is unfair to have the defendant start off in the case with the
presumption as evidence in his favor where the plaintiff has the burden of
proof of showing his negligence. But for some strange reason, the court
failed to see the unfairness of allowing the plaintiff to start off with a presumption in her favor on the issue of contributory negligence where the
defendant had the burden of proving that contributory negligence.
Once again it would appear that the fact that a decedent's conduct was
involved in the case caused the court to miss what should have been obvious.
It can only be regretted that the hearing of the Supreme Court never took
place.

The recent case of Meyers v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co.41

is on sounder ground. In this case the plaintiff was injured as a result of
the dropping upon him of material being hoisted in a steam shovel. The
plaintiff himself testified as to his conduct up to the time of the accident and
the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The court had instructed the
jury that it was presumed that the plaintiff was exercising ordinary care at
the time of the happening of the accident. In considering the defendant's
contention that the giving of this instruction in such a case as this was prejudicial error, the court said:
"In this case the negligence of each of the parties was in issue before the
jury and upon these issues of negligence the proof made presented close questions of fact. . . .By its unequivocal terms the jury were told that the
plaintiff was clothed with a presumption of due care, and that this presumption would stand against direct evidence to the contrary. This instruction
if followed by the jury would exclude from their consideration any evidence
of negligence on the part of the plaintiff and effectively bar the defense of
contributory negligence . ..in [such] case the evidence offered by the
of the
defendant of plaintiff's negligence could not, under the admonition
42
court, receive that fair consideration to which it was entitled."1
1108
"Id.

CalApp.2d 529,239 P.2d 118 (1952).
at 535, 239 P.2d 118, 122.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

There is a line of cases that has added to the difficulty of proper analysis
in this area. In these cases the plaintiff presents his evidence of the defendant's negligence and is then non-suited. In many of them, the plaintiff is a
representative of a decedent in an action for wrongful death. Oftentimes,
the plaintiff in proving the happening of the accident is necessarily required
to show certain conduct on the part of himself or his decedent from which
an inference of contributory negligence might be drawn. It requires no
citation of authority to recognize that contributory negligence may properly be inferred from the plaintiff's own evidence. In these cases, however,
the appellate court almost always reverses the trial court's granting of a
non-suit and inevitably a discussion comes up concerning the presumption of
due care on the part of the decedent or of the plaintiff. It is submitted that
in 99 cases out of 100 of this type, there is absolutely no necessity for discussing the presumption of due care.
In the first place it is not the function of the court to weigh evidence when
considering a motion for a non-suit. At the end of the plaintiff's case, the only
function for the court is to consider the plaintiff's evidence of the defendant's
negligence, giving it every possible favorable inference, and decide whether
or not on the evidence submitted, a jury would be justified in finding the
defendant negligent and the plaintiff free from contributory negligence.
As has been pointed out, the plaintiff is under no compulsion to offer any
evidence on his freedom from contributory negligence. It would only be in
the rarest cases where the plaintiff, in attempting to make out a case of the
defendant's negligence, could properly be non-suited at the end of his case.
If he is non-suited, it could either be on the grounds that he had failed to
make out a prima facie case of the defendant's negligence or on the ground
that he succeeded in proving his own contributory negligence as a matter of
law.
How rare this would be, and is, is shown by the fact that defendants
seldom succeed in proving a plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence as
a matter of law. For the plaintiff to do it in attempting to prove his case
against the defendant is almost impossible except in those cases where the
plaintiff has absolutely no case to start with.
The important point to be considered here, however, is that it is not the
presumption of due care on the part of the plaintiff or his decedent that
requires a reversal of the judgment of non-suit. Assuming for the moment
that the presumption of due care is evidence, it is evidence in rebuttal of the
defendant's case on contributory negligence and if it ever is to be weighed,
it is to be weighed only when weighing the evidence on contributory negligence. Considering it or discussing it in a case involving a non-suit is illogical
yet it is in these cases that the rule is often laid down that the presumption
of due care (now being invoked to protect the plaintiff and prevent his non-
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suit) is not dispelled from the case unless the plaintiff's own evidence shows
his contributory negligence as a matter of law.
Of course the presumption of due care is "dispelled" from the case if
the plaintiff's own evidence shows his contributory negligence as a matter
of law. In fact the plaintiff himself is "dispelled" from the case because he
then has no case at all. Some of the cases arising from judgments of nonsuit in which the courts fail to analyze exactly what it is they are doing,
are Milani v. Southern Pacific Co.,4" Seaford v. Smith,44 (In this case the
plaintiff was non-suited after making out what was clearly an adequate case
of the defendant's negligence and the defendant invoked the presumption
of due care on the part of his deceased agent who was killed in the accident
out of which the case arose; the court of course pointed out that in considering
the judgment of non-suit, a presumption of the decedent's due care was irrelevant yet the so-called "general rule" on the dispelling of the presumption
was unnecessarily discussed) and
ahrenbrock v. Los Angeles Transit
Lines.45 (In this case the court again found it necessary to invoke the presumption to save the plaintiff from a non-suit. The reasoning seems to be
that the plaintiff had offered evidence of his own contributory negligence.
Therefore, if his evidence shows he was contributorily negligent as a matter
of law, he is out of court but there is a presumption of due care. Therefore,
in spite of his own evidence of his own negligence, the presumption creates
a conflict in the evidence, the conflict in the evidence creats a jury question
on contributory negligence.)
Thus the plaintiff has put himself out, the presumption has put him back
in and all this is done without the defendant offering one whit of evidence on
the issue of contributory negligence, the burden of which he must sustain.
This nonsense could be avoided by simply giving the plaintiff's evidence every
favorable inference to which it is entitled, and deciding he cannot be nonsuited because he has not shown himself guilty of contributory negligence
as a matter of law.
In these cases, if the plaintiff's contributory negligence is only a permissible rather than a required inference he cannot be non-suited because the
jury may not see fit to draw that inference. Discussion of the rules governing
the presumption of due care is unnecessary and misleading.
One of the rare cases in which the plaintiff was properly non-suited at
the close of his case on the grounds that he had proven his own contributory
negligence as a matter of law is the case of Levin v. Brown.4 6 In this case
the plaintiff survived the accident and he testified to his conduct right up
to the time when he was hit by a railroad train in broad daylight. His testi"93
"86
"84
"81

Cal.App.2d
CalApp.2d
CaLApp.2d
CaLApp.2d

527, 209 P.2d 413
339, 194 P.2d 792
236,190 P.2d 272
913, 185 P.2d 329

(1949).
(1948).
(1948).
(1948).

152

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

mony showed that he did not see the train until it was right on top of him.
There was no obstruction to his vision and his vision was admittedly normal.
The court properly decided that the only possible inference from such testimony was that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. There was
no need for any discussion of the presumption of due care because the
plaintiff had submitted his conduct to the court and testified fully to that
conduct. However, the court on appeal once again cited the rule that the
presumption of due care is dispelled when the plaintiff's contributory negligence is shown as a matter of law by his own evidence.
The case of Heintz v. Southern Pacific47 is somewhat unusual in that
the plaintiff in a wrongful death action was non-suited on the basis that the
decedent's conduct, as proven by certain evidence and necessary inferences,
amounted to contributory negligence in law. It is interesting to note in the
case that there actually were no eyewitnesses of any kind to the conduct
of the decedent prior to the fatal accident. The evidence showed that the
decedent had driven directly into a railroad car which the defendant company
had left in a stationary position on its tracks where they crossed a thoroughfare. The plaintiff's witnesses testified that the railroad car was visible for
at least 300 feet in the direction in which the decedent approached. There
was no evidence that the decedent had either swerved or applied his brakes
prior to the impact. The court assumed that there was a question of fact for
the jury on the defendant's negligence. The non-suit was based on the
decedent's contributory negligence as a matter of law.
As might be expected, there was a strong dissent in this case by Justice
Griffin. Part of his argument was based upon the fact that there were no
eyewitnesses and that the decedent was entitled to a presumption of due care.
But Justice Griffin devotes most of his argument to showing that the inference
of contributory negligence was not an inference that the jury was required
to draw. As he says:
"I am convinced that a question of fact arose for the determination of the
jury as to whether the driver was guilty of contributory negligence and that
the question was not one of law."

Once it was determined that it was legally possible for the jury to find,
from the plaintiff's evidence, that the defendant was negligent and that the
plaintiff was free from negligence, the problem was solved. It cannot be
emphasized too strongly that the presumption of due care on the decedent's
part is not the evidence which made it possible for the jury to find the plaintiff
free of contribut6ry negligence. That question can only be answered upon
a careful consideration of the plaintiff's evidence offered by himself or his
witnesses as to his or his decedent's conduct.
"763 Cal.App.2d 699, 147 P.2d 621 (1944).
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The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Scott v. Burke4 s appears
to be destined to be somewhat of a landmark case. The case is extremely
unusual in that the plaintiff's case rested entirely upon the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur and the defendant's case rested entirely upon the presumption
of due care. The plaintiffs were passengers in an automobile driven by the
defendant. The accident occurred on a straight stretch of road in the daytime,
the weather being clear and dry. The physical evidence showed that the automobile had left its own side of the highway, crossed the oncoming lane, and
went off the highway on the opposite side, leaving approximately 78 feet of
broken and recurrent skid marks as it traveled across the highway. There
were tire marks for approximately 175 feet left by the vehicle after it had
gone off the highway. At the time of the accident, the plaintiffs were asleep.
As a result of the accident the defendant testified that his head injuries
resulted in a total loss of memory and that it was impossible for him to testify
as to how the accident happened. The jury was instructed on the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur. They were further instructed that if they believed the
defendant as a result of the shock of the accident was unable to remember and
testify as to his own conduct or other facts of the accident, then a presumption arose that he was "obeying the law and was exercising ordinary care
and doing such acts as an ordinary prudent person would have done in the
same circumstances." The defendant had a verdict. The defendant did not
dispute that this was a proper case for the application of the doctrine of
res ipsa loquiturbut the plaintiff did contend on appeal that it was prejudicial
error to instruct the jury on the presumption of due care on behalf of the
defendant. The court pointed out the general rule that in the absence of
eyewitnesses, a party who cannot testify as to his conduct at the time of the
accident because of resulting amnesia, if that fact is believed, is entitled to
the presumption that he was exercising due care at the time of the accident.
The court overlooked the fact that this presumption as set forth in our Code
of Civil Procedure is properly applicable only on the question of contributory
negligence and that the due care which is presumed is "ordinary care for
his own concerns." This, however, is the least of the errors in the majority
opinion. The plaintiff contended that in a case involving the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur on behalf of the plaintiff, it is error to instruct on the presumption of due care on behalf of the defendant. The plaintiffs were relying on
California cases so holding. For our purposes here, it is interesting to note
that the Supreme Court distinguished all of the cases relied on by
plaintiffs on the grounds that the instruction on the presumption of due care
requested by the defendants in those cases was improper in any event in that
either the defendant testified to his own conduct up to the time of the accident

or in that it did not appear from the cases that the defendant did not so testify.
4839

Cal2d 388, 247 P.2d 313 (1952).
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There were one or two cases supporting the plaintiff's contention which the
court could not thoroughly distinguish. By implication they are overruled.
The error of this opinion is pointed out by Justice Traynor in his
dissent, concurred in by Justice Edmonds, and it goes back to the fundamental mistake of considering a presumption as evidence. The majority
clearly felt that the crucial evidence before the jury was an inference of
negligence and a presumption of due care to be carefully weighed by them
in arriving at a verdict. Actually, this metaphysical exercise was not required
even to the slightest extent.
The burden of proving the defendant's negligence, of course, was upon
the plaintiff at the outset of his case. The manner in which the accident
happened made the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applicable. This doctrine
is based upon the fact that the defendant is presumed to be in a better
position to explain the happening of the accident than is the plaintiff. The
doctrine does not shift the ultimate burden of proof. If the defendant comes
forward with evidence which, if believed, shows that he is in no better position
to explain the happening of the accident than the plaintiff, the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur does not then, as Justice Traynor says, "spontaneously
generate" evidence. Under such circumstances, the jury should properly
be left with the physical evidence available, to be weighed by the jury in
order to ascertain whether or not the plaintiff has sustained his burden of
showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was negligent.
As far as the defendant is concerned, he has no need of the presumption
of due care and in fact is not entitled to it. There is no presumption in
California that a person is free from negligence toward another person except
as is necessarily embodied in the plaintiff's having the burden of proving
the defendant's negligence by a preponderance of the evidence, and it would
be highly prejudicial to add to a plaintiff's burden of proving a negligence
case the additional burden of overcoming a presumption that amounts to
evidence that a defendant is free from negligence. In reference to this
problem, Justice Traynor points out:
"This additional burden was placed upon plaintiffs only because defendant was unable to remember what happened. It is true that any disparity
between the parties with respect to their sources of information may justify
placing the burden upon one rather than the other or creating a presumption
in favor of the party with the burden of proof. Thus if the burden had been
upon the defendant to prove that he was not negligent, his inability to present
evidence because of his amnesia might justify a presumption in his favor
that he was exercising due care. . . .In this case, however, defendant
received all the procedural protection to which he was entitled when the burden of proof was placed upon plaintiffs. There is no general rule of law that
the quantum of proof required of the party bearing the burden of proof
increases beyond the usual preponderance of probability because his opponent
happens to be ignorant of the facts. Even if one assumed the wisdom of such

"PRESUMPTION OF DUE CARE" IN CALIFORNIA

155

a rule, its operation should be explained to the jury in an intelligent manner.
The jury should be instructed not that there is a presumption that is evidence,

but that because of defendant's inability to testify, they should demand of
plaintiffs a higher degree of proof. . . . The evidence with respect to the
accident was found only in the physical facts. Plaintiffs were entitled to have

the jury consider those facts and then decide, unhampered by any presumption against them, whether it was more probable than not, that the defendant's
negligence caused the accident." (Emphasis added.)

This language clearly applies to the case where the plaintiff is invoking
a presumption of due care as evidence in his case and the defendant is
attempting to sustain the burden of proving the plaintiff's contributory negligence. It remains to be seen what the fate of the case of Scott v. Burke will
be over the years. One cannot help but feel that sooner or later the confusion
that has arisen in our law from treating inferences and presumptions as
substantive evidence will one day be ended by a recognition of the proper
role of presumptions and inferences.
The case of Anthony v. Hobbie40 might appear at first glance to be
somewhat inconsistent with Speck v. Sarver. In fact, however, the majority
opinion indicates that the presumption of due care was not dispelled by the
plaintiff's evidence because the plaintiff in fact offered evidence which only
showed that the decedent was standing approximately in the middle of a
highway at night and that the defendant was driving on his right hand side
of the road. The conduct of the decedent in arriving at his position in the
middle of the highway was not covered by the plaintiff's evidence in any
way. How he got there or why he was there or under what circumstances
he placed himself in that position is unknown from the plaintiff's evidence.
In the dissent by Justice Edmonds, concurred in by Justice Traynor, it is clear
that the dissenting justices viewed the case as covered by the rule of Speck v.
Sarver.
The case of Anderson v. San JoaquinCounty" must be viewed as inconsistent in its language with the case of Speck v. Sarver and Tice v. Kaiser
Co.5 In this case, an action for wrongful death, the plaintiff offered evidence
through two witnesses who covered the manner in which the decedent's car
was being driven prior to and up to the time of the accident, which resulted
in his death.
The evidence in the case showed that the defendant County had negligently allowed the highway on which the accident occurred to become in a
dangerous and defective condition. There was evidence to show the presence
of a large chuckhole in the traveled portion of the highway on the curve
where the accident occurred.
"25 Cal.2d 814, 155 P.2d 826 (1945).
"110 Cal.App.2d 703, 244 P.2d 75 (1952).
"Supra, note 38.
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The plaintiff's witness showed that the decedent's car was being operated
on the right-hand side of the road in a normal manner as it rounded the
curve and that it seemed to go out of control, having veered to the right
toward the pavement edge. It then came across in front of an oncoming truck
on the opposite side of the highway, where the collision took place. The
record indicates that the plaintiff called the driver of the truck and his helper
and that their testimony showed that the decedent's car struck the chuckhole
in question, at which time the car veered over into the path of the truck.
The first point to be noted about the case is that there was no substantial
evidence of the decedent's contributory negligence. The real problem in
the case was the negligence of the defendant in allowing the dangerous and
defective condition to exist and whether or not the defendant County had
had the actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition required to
establish its liability for failure to correct it. This is a case where the giving
of the instruction could hardly have operated to the prejudice of the defendant. However, the court took the opportunity to criticize the case of Tice v.
Kaiser Co. and to ignore the case of Speck v. Sarver upon which it relies
and is based. Inasmuch as the plaintiff had a jury verdict, the implied finding
of the jury that the defendant had failed to sustain his burden of proving
the contributory negligence of the plaintiff was beyond criticism. This would
be true regardless of any instruction on the presumption, on the facts of
this case.
A hearing was denied in the Supreme Court and Justice Traynor dissented as to that denial. It is submitted that it was clear error to give the
instruction and that this case properly belongs with other cases where the
fact a decedent's conduct is involved has tended to mislead the court, or
with the line of cases holding that the giving of the instruction was error
but not prejudicial because of the particular facts of the case. This, of
course, was the situation in the case of Speck v. Sarver.
In many, if not most, litigated negligence cases, the question of contributory negligence is closely contested. The real prejudice in the giving
of the instruction where the plaintiff or his witnesses have accounted for the
conduct in question is in the tendency thereby to extend and perpetuate the
errors and misunderstandings already far too common in our law concerning
the proper role of a presumption in a law suit.
An excellent example of the proper operation of a presumption in a
negligence case is found in a decision by the Supreme Court of the State
of Washington, Sweazey v. Valley Transport.52 This case is typical of many
cases following what might be called the common law rule governing the
operation of presumptions. This particular case was an action for wrongful
death. The decedents were killed when their automobile collided head-on
526

Wash.2d 324, 107 P.2d 567 (1940).
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with a truck driven by an employee of the defendant. The testimony was
conflicting as to which vehicle was on the wrong side of the road. There were
two disinterested witnesses who observed the operation of the decedent's
automobile prior and up to the time of the collision. These witnesses were
called by the defendant and their testimony was attacked by the plaintiff
as to its credibility. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
The defendant appealed. One of the claimed errors was the giving of the
following instruction: "You are instructed that when a person is injured
and dies as a result of a collision, a presumption arises that the person killed
was at the time exercising due care, when there is no credible evidence to
the contrary." (Emphasis added.)
The defendant contended on appeal that the presumption of due care
was overcome by the testimony of disinterested witnesses, and therefore no
instruction on the presumption should have been given to the jury. In discussing the problem, this court quoted one of its own prior opinions to
this effect:
"'This presumption, however, being purely a conclusion, and not evidence of anything, it must follow, it seems to us, that when disinterested
witnesses testify as to such actions of the deceased, even though such testi-

mony may be in conflict or be disputed, the presumption must disappear. In
other words, where there is such testimony, there is no longer any reason
for the rule, and to say that, regardless of such testimony, the jury has a right
to also consider the presumption, would, in our opinion, be permitting the
presumption to be placed in the scale, to be weighed as evidence.' ,53 (Italics
by the court.)
The court then continued:
"We have consistently recognized, in death cases, that the presumption
is not evidence of anything, and relates only to a rule of law as to which
party shall first go forward and produce evidence sustaining a matter in issue.
The presumption, when the opposite party has produced prima facie evidence,
has spent its force and served its purpose.
"We have consistently held that where there is disinterested testimony,
the presumption disappears and is no longer in the case, and that no instruction on the presumption should be submitted to the jury."
The proper rule should be a good deal more clear where the "disinterested testimony" is offered by the plaintiff or his witnesses. There is no
reason in law or logic why the California courts should not one day recognize
that the so-called presumption of due care is not evidence in any sense of
the word and should be dispelled when competent disinterested testimony
is offered by the party against whom the presumption is invoked through
witnesses other than the party, his relatives, employees, servants, agents, etc.
"'Id., 107 P.2d 578; quoting from Morris v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 1 Wash.2d 587,

97 P.2d 119 (1940).
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Our courts have, as this survey of our law on this question has shown, taken
steps that have indicated some progress toward this goal.
What is needed at the present time is a clear-cut recognition that the
evidence of the party invoking the presumption of due care need not show
that party's contributory negligence as a matter of law before the presumption of due care is dispelled from the case. It is sufficient if the party's
evidence of the conduct in question is competent and admissible and covers
the conduct up to and immediately prior to the happening of the accident.
In such a case adding an instruction on the presumption of due care to the
evidence of the party invoking the presumption covering the conduct in
question is to prejudice the party on whom the burden of proving the nonexistence of the fact presumed already rests.
Conclusion
In conclusion, attention should be called to the case of Downing v.
Southern Pacific." This case is authority for the rule in California that
where it is possible for a party to produce eyewitnesses to testify to the
conduct in question, he is not entitled to instructions on the presumption of
due care. The case was an action for wrongful death. The decedent was
killed in his automobile at a railroad crossing. The plaintiff succeeded in
proving an adequate case on the defendant's negligence. The plaintiff neither
had nor offered any independent evidence covering the decedent's conduct
at and prior to the time of the accident. The defendant offered evidence
covering in detail the conduct of its employees and the decedent in the
premises. On appeal from a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant
argued that it was error for the trial court to have instructed on the presumption of due care on behalf of the plaintiff and to refuse such an instruction
on behalf of the defendant. The trial court's action was sustained and the
appellate court said of the defendant's claim to the presumption:
"Where it is possible to call eye witnesses to testify positively to the facts
and circumstances surrounding the accident, the presumption is not
applicable."
The court pointed out that the purpose of the presumption is to come
to the aid of a party who is without "eyewitnesses," but that the presumption
is "given weight only in the absence of evidence on the subject of the
deceased's conduct." The eyewitnesses offered by the defendant were his own
employees and their testimony deprived the defendant of any presumption.
The court was obviously not including a defendant or his agents or servants
in its use of the term "eyewitnesses" as far as the plaintiff was concerned.
The plaintiff was considered as having no available eyewitnesses.
It is submitted that this case represents a proper road to follow and
"15 Cal.App.2d 246, 59 P.2d 578 (1936).
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the cases which have deviated from the principles set forth therein, and set
forth in the cases following its logic discussed in this article, should be
reexamined with the purpose of reconciling and harmonizing our law on this
question of "dispelling" the presumption of due care from a negligence case
so that it will be consistent with the rules of justice and logic.
Whether our courts will ever be able to shake the fallacy that presumptions are evidence remains to be seen. But clearly they are in the strongest
possible position to develop and extend the rule of Speck v. Sarver so that
the prejudice of the errors in misapplying rules governing presumptions can
be completely recognized and so that a plaintiff who offers evidence covering
the conduct in question, or to whom disinterested eyewitness evidence covering the conduct is available but is offered by the defendant, will not be entitled
to argue he should have any presumption in his favor, as evidence that the
conduct in question did not amount to contributory negligence.
It is to be hoped that the following general principles of law will
receive further recognition and application in the California law on the
operation of this "presumption of due care."
1. Presumptions are not evidence in themselves and cannot be intelligently weighed as such.
2. Presumptions are properly considered as procedural devices to
require the production of evidence, for logical or policy reasons, by the party
against whom the presumption is invoked. Presumptions operate so as to
require a finding of the existence of the fact presumed in the absence of
evidence. Once competent evidence is produced covering the subject matter
of the presumption sufficient to present an issue for the trier of fact on the
existence or non-existence of the fact presumed, a presumption should disappear from the case. The facts giving rise to the presumption are then to
be considered only as evidence themselves, for whatever inferences may
properly be drawn from them.
3. Presumptions can properly be used to assist a party with the burden
of proof on an issue, where there is no competent and relevant evidence available to such a party covering the subject matter of the presumption. If, in
such a case, competent and disinterested evidence contrary to the fact presumed is offered by the party against whom the presumption is invoked,
the proper rule should be that the presumption is dispelled from the case.
Even if this evidence is disbelieved, the presumption has operated in requiring its production.
4. Where a party invoking a presumption, whether or not that party
has the burden of proof on the issue, offers evidence covering the subject
matter of the presumption, the presumption is dispelled from the case.
5. The rules governing the operation of the "presumption of due care"
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cannot logically be different simply because the conduct of a decedent is
involved in the case. That fact in itself has no legal or logical significance.
6. Where competent and disinterested testimony covering the subject
matter of a presumption is available to the party invoking the presumption,
and is offered by the party against whom the presumption is invoked, the
presumption should disappear from the case.
7. When a presumption of the existence of a particular fact is allowed
to operate as substantive evidence in a case against competent and relevant
evidence of a party having the burden of proving the non-existence of the
fact presumed, serious prejudice results to the party having this burden of
proof.
8. In order for the evidence of a party invoking a presumption, covering
the subject matter of the presumption, to dispel it from the case, it is not
required that that evidence show the non-existence of the fact presumed
as a matter of law. It is sufficient that the evidence cover the subject matter
of the presumption in question.

